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Abstract The paper develops two related thought experiments exploring varia-
tions on an ‘animat’ theme. Animats are hybrid devices with both artificial and bi-
ological components. Traditionally, ‘components’ have been construed in concrete 
terms, as physical parts or constituent material structures. Many fascinating issues 
arise within this context of hybrid physical organization. However, within the con-
text of functional/computational theories of mentality, demarcations based purely 
on material structure are unduly narrow. It is abstract functional structure which 
does the key work in characterizing the respective ‘components’ of thinking sys-
tems, while the ‘stuff’ of material implementation is of secondary importance. 
Thus the paper extends the received animat paradigm, and investigates some intri-
guing consequences of expanding the conception of bio-machine hybrids to in-
clude abstract functional and semantic structure. In particular, the thought experi-
ments consider cases of mind-machine merger where there is no physical Brain-
Machine Interface: indeed, the material human body and brain have been removed 
from the picture altogether. The first experiment illustrates some intrinsic theoreti-
cal difficulties in attempting to replicate the human mind in an alternative material 
medium, while the second reveals some deep conceptual problems in attempting 
to create a form of truly Artificial General Intelligence. 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper I would like to explore some intriguing conceptual 
terrain concerning implications for future forms of mentality that 
might arise through advances in AI theory and technology. The dis-
cussion will proceed by examining two related variations on an 
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‘animat’ theme. Animat devices are defined as robotic machines 
with both active biological and artificial components (Franklin, 
1995). At first pass, ‘components’ are most graphically construed in 
concrete terms, as brute material parts or constituent physical mech-
anisms. And of course, many intriguing issues arise within this con-
text of hybrid physical organization, wherein biological matter such 
as living neural cells is coupled with engineered robotic components 
such as sensors and actuators. The topic is especially compelling 
when the biological matter in question is a living human body/brain 
that is augmented with technological implants and extensions. This 
‘cyborg’ version of the bio-machine hybrid theme raises profound 
questions about the nature, boundaries and future of the human mind 
that have already stimulated much discussion (e.g. (Clark, 2003)). 
However, within the overall context of Functional/Computational 
Theories of Mind (FCTM) (e.g. (Putnam, 1967), (Fodor, 1975) 
(Johnson-Laird, 1988)) central to Cognitive Science and AI, demar-
cations based purely on material structure are unduly narrow. Ac-
cording to FCTM, it is abstract functional and computational struc-
ture which does the key theoretical work in characterizing and 
individuating the respective ‘components’ of thinking agents, 
whereas, in accord with the principle of Multiple Realizability (MR),  
the ‘stuff’ of material implementation is generally deemed to be of 
secondary importance. Hence the paper aims to extend the received 
animat paradigm, and investigate some consequences of expanding 
the conception of animats and bio-machine hybrids to encompass 
abstract functional and semantic structure, and not just concrete 
physical mechanisms.  
In the standard cyborg case, the core physical system is still hu-
man/biological, and this is then augmented by fusion with artificial 
hardware devices via implants, neuroprosthetics, etc. The issue then 
becomes one of teasing out the implications for human mentality 
and identity that result from this corporeal blend of organic and en-
gineered components. In these standard cases of mind/machine mer-
ger, the biological brain is physically impacted by other material 
structures, via Brain-Machine Interfaces, to produce a system that is 
no longer strictly human, but rather is a hybrid incorporating both 
natural and synthetic aspects.  
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By contrast, in the two thought experiments developed below, the 
entire physical system is synthetic ‒ the ‘brain’ in question is com-
pletely artificial, and the mechanism under investigation is itself an 
advanced technological artifact, a robot. And instead of blending or-
ganic and synthetic physical parts, as in the cyborg paradigm, the 
scenarios below trade on the 'interaction' and comingling of purely 
artificial hardware systems with the abstract formal and linguistic 
structure central to organically engendered human mentality. So the 
hybridization involves a wholly synthetic physical device, in combi-
nation with the abstract, biologically induced cognitive and linguis-
tic architecture of the human species. The issue then becomes one of 
exploring the implications for robot/human mentality that result 
from this hybridization ‒ how much of the ensuing cognitive system 
should now be viewed as properly artificial and how much is still 
human?   
In terms of what's essential to human mental identity, there are at 
least three key factors to consider. One (1) is internal processing 
structure, central to FCTM. This abstract template or computational 
blueprint is a defining characteristic of the human cognitive type, 
and it's the result of many eons of organic evolution and natural se-
lection. Another critical feature (2) is our conscious experience or 
phenomenology: the field of occurrent, qualitative presentations (or 
P-consciousness, in Block's (1995) terminology). Our introspective 
self-identity is largely determined by this ongoing 'stream of con-
sciousness'. And a third (3) key feature is the content of proposition-
al attitude states such as beliefs and desires. To a great extent, who 
we are is dependent upon what we believe and what we want. Ac-
cording to the standard belief-desire framework of psychological 
explanation, the content of these propositional attitudes is central to 
our status as rational agents, and similarly this feature is vital to 
Dennett's (1981) Intentional Stance. 
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2.  An Artificial Brain as Alternate Realization 
The first ‘abstract animat’ thought experiment begins by utilizing 
feature (1) above. According to FCTM and the attendant principle of 
MR, internal processing structure is not something that is essentially 
about our flesh and blood embodiment, but rather concerns a higher 
level description of our neurological machinery. FCTM gives rise to 
the mind/program analogy, wherein the mind is theoretically cap-
tured at the software level. So let us suppose that sometime in the 
sanguine future, cognitive scientists eventually discern the underly-
ing functional/computational architecture of the human mind, and 
merely for the sake of convenience, let us suppose that it's some 
more sophisticated and far reaching version of Fodor's (1975) Lan-
guage of Thought (LOT), say LOT37* (clearly, this structure would 
have to be capable of far more than simply the manipulation of lin-
guistically encoded propositional attitude states). So let us suppose 
that LOT37* is the formal processing architecture which has been 
organically evolved and is implemented in the brain. It is the level of 
description which characterizes us as advanced cognitive agents, as 
human minds, and the brain is running LOT37* as an indigenous 
formal system of rule governed symbol manipulation, in accord with 
the classical mind/program model.  
The organic brain is then the original physical realizer of LOT37*, 
but according to MR, our biological ‘wetware’ is not in principle 
privileged in this regard. Just as with computational procedures in 
general, it should be possible to take the abstract LOT37* software 
and run it on an artificial hardware device physically quite unlike the 
human brain. So in the first animat scenario, let us assume that this 
impressive theoretical and technological feat has been accomplished 
‒ human scientists have fabricated a purely artificial electro-
mechanical ‘brain’ that implements the human Language of 
Thought. For ease of comparison, we will assume that the artificial 
brain occupies the cranial cavity of a fully operational robot, and 
hence manipulates environmental inputs and produces outputs con-
trolling various forms of behavior in a manner completely analogous 
to a normal human being. Indeed, the artifact is so well crafted that it 
excels at some suitable version of the combined linguistic and robot-
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ic Total Turing Test (Harnad, 1991) and its success is due to the fact 
that the robot is an alternate realization of our own cognitive soft-
ware. 
Turing's original test is designed as an 'imitation game', where the 
goal is to fool someone into thinking that the computer is human. 
The strategy is intended to screen off anticipated (and perhaps out-
dated) human prejudice towards artifacts, by appealing to a standard 
whereby they are deemed behaviorally indistinguishable from us. 
But this induces a number of red-herrings, since the goal strays from 
detecting general intelligence per se to slavishly impersonating hu-
mans, warts and all (see French, 2000). In the current discussion I 
will therefore shift the emphasis from indistinguishability to the 
more salient goal of producing externally observable capabilities on 
a par with humans in terms of exhibiting broad-spectrum intelli-
gence. In particular, in order to pass the presently contemplated 'soft' 
version of the Total Turing Test, the robot is not required to mislead 
the judges into mistaking it for a corporeal human, since this would 
add a myriad of restrictions and complications which are not rele-
vant to the overall project of AI. So we will allow the judges to be 
cognizant of the fact that the robot is not physically a human. We 
will assume that they are suitably fair minded and impartial, and the 
task of the robot is to exhibit behavior that would count as appropri-
ately intelligent in the general human case. 
The robot is entirely artificial in terms of its physical organization 
and composition, but it is nonetheless a genuine case of biomechani-
cal hybridization, since its cognitive architecture is an instance of the 
human LOT37*. Thus its mechanical body and synthetic ‘central 
nervous system’ are advanced technological artifacts, while the ab-
stract cognitive processing essential to its identity as a thinking 
agent is an organically engendered cognitive template. An artificial 
brain is running the software of the human mind, and in contrast to a 
standard cyborg case, there is now no biological or organic matter 
present, but only the abstract computational structure of human 
cognition, which structure possesses a clearly biological as opposed 
to artificial etiology. According to FCTM, it is this LOT37* structure 
which distinguishes us at the cognitive level, and we have replicated 
this defining human mental characteristic in an artificial brain. 
Hence at the salient level of description the biological brain and the 
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robot's artificial analogue are functionally identical, and thus it may 
appear that, although the robot's synthetic brain is physically quite 
distinct from our own organic hardware, it nonetheless supports a 
purely human mind. However, I will now invoke feature (2) above to 
argue that this is not the whole story. 
Conscious experience is a notoriously problematic topic, about 
which there is well known and abundant disagreement. Many theo-
rists (e.g. Fodor) invoke FCTM only to explain the high level cogni-
tive processing involved in propositional attitude states and rational 
action, while at the same time bracketing the entire issue of qualia 
and phenomenology. However, other authors, including (Lycan, 
1987), (Jackendoff, 1987), (Johnson-Laird, 1988), (Chalmers, 1996) 
try to extend the reach of the computational paradigm, and contend 
that conscious states themselves arise via the implementation of the 
appropriate functional or information processing structure. Let us 
denote this extension of the basic FCTM framework ‘FCTM+’.  
In contrast, a primary alternative to FCTM+ contends that it is the 
physical substrate, the actual material realizer of the abstract func-
tional structure which must be invoked in the explanation of con-
scious presentations (as in (Churchland, 1984)). This opposing view 
is a form of physicalist type-type identity theory, wherein particular 
material structures or processes are identified as constituting, ‘giving 
rise to’, or providing the supervenience base for the corresponding 
phenomenal state or property. In the case of human consciousness, 
salient aspects of the biological brain are thus hypothesized as re-
sponsible for various features of subjective experience, and this 
guides the empirical search for ‘neural correlates’ of consciousness 
and attendant psycho-physical mappings.  
In comparison, a distinguishing feature of FCTM+ is that it advo-
cates a form of ‘non-reductionist’ token-token physicalism motivat-
ed by the principle of Multiple Realizability. As noted above, ab-
stract computational procedures can be implemented via any number 
of quite distinct types of physical configuration. For example, classi-
cal Turing machines, conceived as finite programs of instructions for 
manipulating 0's and 1's, have the ontological status of mathematical 
abstractions. Like differential equations, sets, Euclid’s perfectly 
straight lines, etc., Turing machines don’t exist in real time or space, 
and they have no causal powers. In order to perform actual compu-
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tations, an abstract Turing machine must be realized or instantiated 
by some suitable arrangement of mass/energy. And as Turing (1950) 
observed long ago, there is no privileged or unique way to do this.  
The very same abstract Turing machine can be implemented via 
modern electronic circuitry, a Victorian contraption made of gears 
and levers (a la Babbage's Analytical Engine), a human being fol-
lowing the instructions by hand using notepad and pencil (as in the 
banks of clerks working at Bletchley Park), as well as more ‘devi-
ant’ physical arrangements such as roles of toilet serving as the ma-
chine tape and empty beer cans for the cipher ‘1’. Thus there is no 
uniform reduction from type of computational state to type of physi-
cal state. But each particular instance or physically realized token of 
a given abstract state is still just a particular physical state or pro-
cess, governed by the ordinary laws of nature. Hence the ontological 
commitments are held to be physicalist but non-reductivist. 
The position I will now advocate is that FCTM+ is mistaken, and 
that qualia must supervene upon the physical substrate rather than 
the functional organization. Why? ‒ because unlike computational 
formalisms (as well as propositional attitude states, viewed 
dispositionally as high level, counterfactual-supporting configura-
tions of a computational system), conscious states are inherently 
non-abstract; they are actual, occurrent phenomena extended in 
physical time. Many qualitative presentations, such as a visual sen-
sation of seeing a bright red dot on a display monitor in some labora-
tory set-up, have a measurable duration, which means that the con-
scious event takes place over some objectively specifiable length of 
time. In sharp contrast, abstract Turing machines are not extended in 
physical time ‒ the computational ‘steps’ are not tethered to any 
units of physical duration and a concrete temporal dimension is en-
tirely lacking. It is only the steps in a materially realized Turing ma-
chine computation that are extended in physical time, and the very 
same steps in different types of realization can have vastly different 
temporal durations ‒ the Analytical Engine will be markedly slower 
than contemporary electronic realizations. 
But FCTM+ is committed to the result that qualitatively identical 
conscious states are maintained across wildly different kinds of 
physical realization, from human neural wet ware to the robot's sili-
con circuitry, to the gears and levers of the Analytical Engine. And 
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this is tantamount to the claim that an actual, substantive and invari-
ant qualitative phenomenon is preserved over radically diverse ma-
terial systems, while at the same time, no internal physical regulari-
ties need to be preserved. But then there is no actual, occurrent 
factor which could serve as the causal substrate or supervenience 
base for the substantive and invariant phenomenon of internal con-
scious experience. The advocate of FCTM+ cannot plausibly rejoin 
that it is invariance of formal or functional role which supplies this 
basis, since formal role is abstract, and such abstract features can on-
ly be implemented via actual properties, but they do not have the 
power to produce them (see Schweizer, 2002) for related discus-
sion).1 
Indeed, physical conservation laws hold that all physical events 
must have a purely physical cause. So if one is really a physicalist 
(as opposed to some sort of crypto-dualist) and holds that occurrent 
qualitative experience is an actual event rather than a mere abstrac-
tion, then it follows that the cause must be physical. Hence it would 
seem to be entailed by basic conservation laws that the material 
brain (natural or synthetic) must do the causal work of the mind. If 
internal conscious states are real phenomena extended in time, then 
their ultimate source must be the brain/hardware ‒ they must depend 
upon intrinsic properties of the realizer as a proper subsystem of the 
actual world.  
Conscious experiences are then seen as hardware states that play 
an abstract functional role. This abstract role remains a legitimate 
software concern, and it must be preserved across divergent realiza-
tions. But the actual properties of consciousness are a feature of the 
material substrate, and (unless one has some sort of ‘magical’ theory 
of computation, whereby implementing a computational formalism 
somehow imbues a physical system with mysterious powers and 
properties over and above its ordinary physical traits) these are not 
guaranteed to be preserved across widely different physical systems. 
Qualitative aspect is essentially conditioned by the hardware and 
hence is largely a matter of our flesh and blood embodiment (the 
above is comparable to some of the views put forward by Searle 
                                                          
1 Thus the critique applies not just to classical computation and the mind/program model, but to 
any approach committed to abstract structural explanation and MR, such as connectionist archi-
tectures. 
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(1992), although here I am making a claim about qualitative states 
simplicitor, and no assertion whatever about ‘Intentionality’). 
My position is not in direct conflict with the functionalist-driven 
view that some advanced functional roles such as a self-model and 
other meta-cognitive features may require conscious implementa-
tion, and hence that alternative realizations of the human cognitive 
template that are purportedly devoid of conscious experience (e.g. 
Block's (1978) 'Chinese Nation') are not genuine possibilities in the 
first place, and hence cannot serve as hypothetical counterexamples 
to FCTM+. Although I am in principle agnostic as to whether any 
functional role is such that it requires conscious presentations, even 
if this constraint on possible implementations is granted, it does not 
follow that the supporting phenomenology must be qualitatively 
identical to ours. There is no reason to suppose that the field of hu-
man conscious experience is the unique solution to the functional 
constraints imposed by LOT37*, and hence the purely abstract struc-
tures of FCTM+ are not sufficient to determine our particular phe-
nomenology.  
Qualitative presentations in the case of, e.g., visual perception, 
play the functional role of providing information about the external 
environment. Hence LOT37* would include functional pathways for 
processing sensory inputs and utilizing this information for execu-
tive control, such as locomotion and navigation. However this is not 
enough to determine the qualitative aspects produced by the physical 
vehicle that implements this role. So the very same abstract LOT37* 
functional specification, when implemented in human neurophysiol-
ogy, will result in qualitatively different phenomenology than when 
implemented in the robot's silicon circuitry. The physical vehicle 
implementing the functional role will determine the actual and 
occurrent aspects of qualitative experience, and indeed, physiologi-
cal variations between human individuals could well induce large 
disparities in qualia, even among con-specifics. 
It's not clear how deeply the LOT37* high-level rational and lin-
guistic processing, integrated with more ancient perceptual and nav-
igational architecture, will penetrate into the qualitatively manifested 
differences in the robot's physical substrate. Thus if employ some 
version of Dennett's (1992, 2003) 'heterophenomenology', it's con-
ceivable that the robot could report on qualitative aspects of its con-
10  
scious states that diverge from ours, and hence would cause it to fail 
a Total Turing Test designed as a strict 'imitation game'. But in the 
context of the present thought experiment we will assume that the 
robot is indeed functionally isomorphic, and hence its verbal outputs 
reveal no qualitative differences, as in the case of qualitative varia-
tions between con-specifics not revealed through verbal outputs. 
There are a number of different types of conscious states, includ-
ing perceptual, cognitive, and affective. The LOT37* will encompass 
high-level rational and linguistic processing, integrated with more 
ancient perceptual and navigational architecture, and these will be 
realized by divergent physical media in the robotic 'cognitive clone'. 
However, affective conscious states, such as moods and emotions, 
are far less obviously tethered to abstract processing structure, and 
much more directly related to brute biochemical influences. Since 
the robot is a synthetic device, it will not possess human hormones, 
and thus we should expect its affective states (if any) to be qualita-
tively distinct from ours.  
And as a final consideration in this vein, it's relevant to mention 
'noise' as yet a fourth type of conscious experience. For example, 
when I rub my knuckles against my closed eyes and then open them, 
I see various twinkling yellow spots. As with the tingling sensation 
of a sneeze, etc., I would take these phenomena to serve no func-
tional role whatever, but rather to be mere noise in my organic 
hardware system ‒ just evolutionary spandrels. And since the robot's 
hardware is fundamentally different, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that it would not experience qualitatively identical forms of noise.2  
In any case, it's quite safe to say that consciousness is still deeply 
mysterious, and currently no one has a firmly established or concep-
tually complete and satisfactory account. Given our present state of 
insipient understanding, it's inevitable that conjecture and specula-
tion will abound. Neither the FCTM+ view nor the contrasting 
hardware based account defended above are yet confirmed (or defin-
itively refuted). I've offered some criticisms of the functionalist view 
and various reasons for favoring the hardware based approach, but it 
nonetheless remains an open question. And the focus of the current 
                                                          
2 There is nothing to prevent an FCTM+ advocate from attributing a functional role to tingles, af-
terimages, etc., but I would view this as merely an ad hoc strategy for defending their theory 
against an obvious objection. 
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exercise is a thought experiment, rather than an attempt to conclu-
sively establish the truth of some proposition. So for the purposes of 
the thought experiment, those who might still adhere to FCTM+ are 
invited to construe the results in a conditional format ‒ if the (specu-
lative) hardware based account turns out to be correct and the (spec-
ulative) FCTM+ view turns out to be false, then the consequent fol-
lows. Hence for the sake of argument we will now proceed on the 
assumption that the antecedent of the foregoing conditional turns out 
to be true. 
So although the robot's mind is functionally identical to that of a 
human, we should expect its synthetic phenomenology to be highly 
divergent, since the substrate in which the functional structure is re-
alized is very different than human neurophysiology. The hypothet-
ical robot brain sustains a form of artificial consciousness that is 
qualitatively distinct from ours, and potentially very alien. Thus to 
the extent that phenomenology is a constituent of general mentality, 
the robot mind is distinct from the human mind. The LOT37* pro-
cessing structure is the result of many eons of organic evolution and 
natural selection, and in this respect the robot's cognitive architec-
ture has a clearly biological etiology. But even though the robot's 
abstract mental processing structure is quintessentially human, its 
conscious experience is artificial, and is qualitatively dissimilar to 
ours. Hence the overall type of mind induced is not purely human, 
but rather is a bio-machine hybrid.  
3.  An Artificial Brain Implementing Synthetic Cognitive  
Architecture 
The second scenario takes yet a further step of abstraction. In the 
first case we detached computational structure from underlying 
hardware, and exploited MR to yield an artificial realization of the 
biologically evolved LOT37*. Now we will abstract away from in-
ternal factors altogether, including both physical substrate and the 
cognitive software it's running. We consider a computational artifact 
again capable of passing the combined linguistic and robotic Total 
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Turing Test, but where the robot's internal processing structure is 
now entirely artificial. The robot's cognitive architecture has been 
custom designed by AI researchers, and is functionally as unlike 
LOT37* as the first robot's artificial ‘brain’ is physically unlike hu-
man neurophysiology. This is a case of successfully manifesting all 
aspects of intelligent human behavior in the shared linguistic and 
spatiotemporal environment, but where this is achieved via an inter-
nal processing structure vastly different from humans.  
In response to the question above ‒ how much of the robot's mind 
should be viewed as properly artificial? ‒ it may appear that in this 
case the answer should be ‘all of it’, that we have succeeded in pro-
ducing a truly synthetic mind, comprised of both artificial software 
and an artificial brain (and perhaps replete with synthetic phenome-
nology, as in the previous thought experiment). However, I will now 
invoke feature (3) to argue that, again, this is not the whole story.  
The content of propositional attitude states such as beliefs and de-
sires is surely a core feature of minds. As above, to a great extent, 
our mental identity is dependent upon what we believe and what we 
want. According to the standard belief-desire framework of psycho-
logical explanation, the content of these propositional attitudes is 
central to our status as rational agents and similarly this feature is 
vital to Dennett's Intentional Stance. And this is important, because 
the issue at hand does not concern the bare mechanical and engineer-
ing factors involved in designing and building a robot able to pass 
the Total Turing Test. Instead the issue concerns the subsequent 
evaluation of the artifact with respect to its semantic and intentional 
properties, including genuine intelligence, understanding, reference 
for its assorted linguistics outputs, and the attribution of associated 
mental states, such as believing that snow is white, knowing that wa-
ter is H2O, wanting to pass the Total Turing Test, etc.  
As in the case of behaviorally indistinguishable humans, the robot 
will be evaluated as an Intentional System harboring assorted be-
liefs, desires and other intentional states, and whose behavior can be 
explained and predicted on the basis of the content of these states. 
Accordingly, the robot's salient sonic emissions are interpreted as 
asserting various propositions and expressing assorted cognitive 
contents. For example, suppose Robbie the Robot, our hypothetical 
Total Turing Test artifact, is ambling down a path and there’s a fall-
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en log in the way. Robbie lifts his artificial leg unusually high and 
steps over the log. When asked ‘Why did you lift your leg so high?’ 
Robbie emits the rejoinder ‘I saw the fallen log and did not want to 
trip on it.’ Robbie is reporting the content of his relevant proposi-
tional attitude states in English, and if we are to interpret him as 
such then they depend in an essential manner on the public, external-
ly determined semantics for this human Natural Language (NL). 
This is entailed if we are to construe the artifact as a rational agent, 
as the locus of some genuine form of mentality, and hence as using 
NL in a meaningful and referential manner, rather than just mention-
ing syntactic strings generated by its internal linguistic processing 
system.  
According to Putnam’s (1975) highly influential and compelling 
analysis, the semantics of NL ‘ain’t in the head’ of any individual 
human agent, but rather are set by the encompassing sociolinguistic 
community of which the agent is a member. But if linguistic mean-
ings ain’t in the head of any individual humans, then they surely 
ain't in the data base of Robbie the Robot. As originally propounded 
by Burge (1979), Putnam’s semantic externalism for NL implies that 
mental content is non-individualistic. The propositional attitudes of 
human individuals derive their meaning from the engulfing sociolin-
guistic medium.  
And just as in the case of individual human mentality, so too for 
Robbie. The Total Turing Test robot is inextricably embedded in a 
human sociolinguistic community with its associated network of 
human cognitive scaffolding (Rupert, 2009). Thus because of se-
mantic externalism and the ineleminable role of the biologically en-
gendered sociolinguistic medium, the robot's wide mental content 
will be derived from the embedding Natural Language culture. Even 
though Robbie is wholly non-natural as an isolated artifact, his wide 
propositional attitudes will be no more artificial than yours or mine, 
and his essential status as an Intentional System is dependent on the 
human sociolinguistic culture in which he functions (see Schweizer, 
2012 for further discussion). 
So to the extent that he’s a rational agent susceptible to the 
framework of Belief-Desire explanation and prediction, Robbie’s 
mind has an ineliminable human component. Natural languages have 
evolved over many cycles of adaptation and selection, and in this 
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sense the sociolinguistic context upon which Robbie's mental con-
tent depends can be seen as an ‘organic’ component with a clearly 
biological etiology. Hence such a robot would not be a case of pure-
ly artificial mentality, but rather a complex blend of artificial inter-
nal processing structures in conjunction with biologically engen-
dered sociolinguistic content. In the general case, mental states are 
determined both by internal factors, such as computational pro-
cessing configurations and phenomenology, as well as external fac-
tors, such as the wide propositional content of beliefs and desires. 
Hence the robot is a bio-machine hybrid in terms of its external ver-
sus internal facets of mentality.  
4. Conclusion 
The discussion has extended the received animat paradigm by ex-
ploring two cases of genuine mind-machine merger, but where there 
is no physical Brain-Machine Interface ‒ indeed, the material human 
body/brain has been removed from the picture altogether. The first 
thought experiment utilizes FCTM and the attendant principle of 
MR to envision a case where the quintessentially human LOT37* 
functional/computational architecture is implemented in a humanoid 
artifact. The widely embraced mind/program analogy would seem to 
imply that the resulting 'cognitive clone' would possess a purely hu-
man mind, sustained by an alternative physical substrate. However, 
it is argued that the situation is not so straightforward, and that the 
artificial consciousness induced by the robot's divergent hardware 
would result in a type of mentality not purely human, but rather a 
form of bio-machine hybrid. And this illustrates some intrinsic theo-
retical difficulties in attempting to replicate the human mind in an al-
ternative material medium.  
In the second thought experiment, the human body/brain as well as 
its organically engendered cognitive architecture have been re-
moved, and the robot in question runs custom designed artificial 
software. Nonetheless, its status as an Intentional System, and the at-
tendant content of its propositional attitude states is essentially hu-
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man, which illustrates some deep theoretical difficulties in attempt-
ing to create a form of purely Artificial General Intelligence, a truly 
artificial mind.3 
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